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This paper is a study of Flags of Convenience and how their use has affected the
number of British and Norwegian merchant mariners available for crewing NATO
ships. A trend and regression analysis is presented to describe the relationship between
the decline in ship registration and the decline in merchant marine officers in the
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
When the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance is involved in a
war or emergency situation, different NATO members have agreed to transfer ocean
ships in their respective flag fleets to a common pool. The pool's purpose is to ensure
that shipping assets are used in the overall best interest of the alliance. The ships will
be managed by the Defense Shipping Authority (DSA) which is an agency set up by
NATO on its behalf. The DSA is concerned with the pooling and allocation of all
oceangoing ships under control of the participating countries to meet military and
civilian needs. [Ref. 1: p. 2-1]
The DSA only functions during war and emergency situations. In times of peace
the NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping (PBOS) coordinates and
administratively handles contingency plans in the specific area of ocean shipping. The
PBOS is made up of representatives from all NATO countries. It is a primary concern
of the PBOS to monitor NATO merchant shipping assets. Additionally it must
monitor member government policies to see how they will affect the availability of
ships. [Ref. 2: p. 157]
B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The NATO merchant fleets have been experiencing a steady exodus from their
respective flag fleets. This exodus is a result of owners' transferring flag registry of
their ships to another country's flag registry. This reflagging makes for fewer and
fewer ships under control of the individual NATO member governments and to the
NATO alliance as a whole. When the merchant fleets decline there is also a decline in
the number of NATO merchant officers. The decline of officers is a direct result of a
reduction in available jobs, inability to maintain licenses, lack of job security, and
foreign labor filling jobs that no longer require national labor. The lack of NATO
merchant officers could cause major difficulties during a NATO emergency. These
difficulties would be in the area of providing the required number of NATO mariners
to man the pool of ships. NATO mariners are required because of concerns with
security, loyalty, and dependability of the crews. [Ref. 3: p. 83]
C. METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY
Data from the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) was compiled on the
number of ships registered to the United Kingdom and Norway. Additional data was
collected from the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development on
masters, deck, radio and engineering officers employed in the merchant marines of
Norway and the United Kingdom (UK). The data makes possible a trend analysis to
shed some light on the ability to crew DSA pooled ships with the required number of
NATO mariners. A regression analysis is also used to determine the exact relationship
between the ship data and the merchant officer data. The analysis can also give the
general overall capability of Norway and UK to meet NATO manning requirements
during times of contingency and war.
D. LIMITATIONS
This study is limited to the United Kingdom and Norwegian merchant marine
ships in order to make it manageable, and the data is based on ships of 1,000 gross
registered tons (grt). In addition, the study is further restricted to encompass only
master, deck, radio, and engineering officer personnel levels. The employment figures
are tabulated by 100 grt. The DSA intends to deal only with ships 1,600 grt. unless
specific exception is made by them, or the PBOS [Ref. 1: pp. 2-5]. This limitation
causes some difficulty in matching the data. The total number of ships required of
DSA by member nations is constantly changing because of changing ship types
available in the llag registries. As of September 1987 the total ships ear-marked for use
in the pool was 456. [Ref. 4]
E. CONTENTS
The NATO merchant marine manning problems that must be faced by the PBOS
and DSA are a result of reflagging to flag of convenience. NATO members'
government policies and the ship owners' quest to operate their ships at the most
efficient cost are both contributors to the NATO merchant marine situation of today.
Chapter II provides a brief overview of the history of flags of convenience and the
reasons for their rise in popularity. Chapter III describes United Kingdom and
Norway present and proposed policies and how they may affect the merchant marine
officer levels and ships available NATO use. Chapter IV provides for a discussion and
analysis of the data. Chapter V presents the conclusions of the study.
'Gross Registered Tons is a common measurement of internal volume of a ship
with certain spaces excluded. One ton equals 100 cubic feet.
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II. BRIEF HISTORY OF FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE
A. INTRODUCTION
NATO merchant ships involved in the reinforcement or resupply of Europe are
to be manned by NATO merchant mariners. The availability of these merchant
mariners may determine whether or not the reinforcement and resupply are
accomplished. The availability of NATO crews may affect the smoothness of the
operations. The ability to find, assign, and deploy merchant officers will greatly affect
the movement of vital cargo to Europe. In addition, the unqualified loyalty, which
may be expected from NATO merchant mariners whose countries are at war, may be
far greater than the loyalty of a non-NATO merchant officer in the same situation.
The present status of NATO merchant marine shipping and officer availability is the
result of a long history of political and economic conditions giving rise to registering
ships to foreign flags, flags of convenience.
B. DEFINITION OF FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE
A flag of convenience (FOC) is the flag of any country permitting the registration
of foreign owned and foreign controlled ships under circumstances which are
convenient and favorable for the persons who are registering the ships [Ref. 5: p. 21].
These flags represent countries that have lenient tax laws and little or no restrictions
on the nationality of the labor force employed on ships carrying their flag. FOC
nations may also have less stringent safety regulations than other nations.
C. EARLY HISTORY OF FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE
Use of flags of convenience began many years ago. It occurred for many reasons
different from those we find in today's shipping industry. The history of shipping
provides several cases of what today is called a flag of convenience.
Ship owners who in days gone by saw any advantage in changing their flag of
registration would affix their ships to a foreign merchant fleet. English merchants
sailed under the Spanish flag in the sixteenth century. These English merchants found
that changing their flag from British to Spanish was the only way to engage in the
highly profitable West Indies trade. The Spanish government prohibited all vessels but
those flying the Spanish flag to use the West Indies trade routes. [Ref. 5: p. 5]
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The Newfoundland "boat fisherman" of the seventeenth century were faced with
deportation by the English. The English were concerned over the competition that the
"boat fisherman" were giving English fisherman. The Newfoundland fisherman simply
changed their registration to the French flag and went on with their business.
[Ref. 5: p. 5]
In the nineteenth century, trawlers changed their flag from English to Norwegian.
The trawler owners were hoping to evade new British legislation which prohibited
trawling activities in the Moray Firth. They changed their flag to evade the legislation.
They thought the legislation would no longer apply to them if they flew the Norwegian
flag. In this case the reflagging did not change their status. Britain had, and still has,
the authority to control fishing in its waters no matter what flag the vessels were
earning. [Ref. 5: p. 6]
During times of war, many owners and whole fleets found it advantageous to
change flags. Many owners reflagged from a hostile state to that of a neutral to avoid
capture. A fine example occurred when Napoleon blockaded the continent. English
ships were reflagged under the flags of German principalities, such as Knyphausen and
Pappenburg, so they could trade freely through the blockade. The merchant marine
fleets of these tiny states expanded rapidly, almost a hundred fold, because of the
reflaggings. In the War of 1812, Massachusetts merchant ship owners reflagged to
Portugal to avoid being captured by the British. [Ref. 5: p. 8]
D. PRE-WORLD WAR I
By the 1900s many ships flew flags different from their actual and ultimate
owners' nationality. The difference was largely due to the rise of corporate ownership.
The reflagging occurred even under rigid provisions which attempted to regulate the
problem of flagging out. Investors placing their financial support into foreign
enterprises were very much the norm for the pre-World War I time-frame. There were
several countries, mostly South American and Central American, at this time who were
interested in attracting foreign capital. These countries allowed foreign owned shipping
to fly their flag. As early as 1854 Argentina, then known as Buenos Aires, and
Honduras had such a policy. [Ref. 5: pp. 8-9]
The United American Line, during the prohibition period of U.S. history, felt
they were unable to compete successfully with other cruise lines who could serve
alcoholic beverages. The prohibition regulations were considered applicable to all
United States territory. A vessel flying the flag of any country is considered a territory
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of that country and is therefore governed by its regulations. The Untied American
Line simply changed its flag of registration to Panama. To change their flag, the
company organized a base company in Panama under the corporate laws of Panama.
The ownership was transferred to the company and the reflagging took place. The
United American Line transfer occurred in 1922. The reregistration allowed the owners
to replace the expensive U.S. union labor with cheaper non-union foreign crews, if they
so desired. This inital reflagging led the way for other U.S. ship owners who saw their
operating costs rising due to union labor. [Ref. 5: p. 10]
E. PRE-WORLD WAR II
Prior to the out break, of World Wrar II many reflaggings occurred. Esso
Shipping Co. changed 25 of their ships from the German registry, the Free City of
Danzig, to the Panamanian flag. They reflagged to remove the German crews and
replace them with Americans. Once the the reflagging and crew change was
accomplished, they could continue to trade with Europe as neutrals. Later these ships
changed to Panamanian crews to avoid violating the Neutrality Act. The act
prohibited these vessels from trading with the European allied nations because they
had U.S. citizens on board. [Ref. 5: pp. 10-11]
When WWII began, many U.S. and European ships were transferred to the
neutral Panamanian flag. The U.S. was not yet in the war, and trading with those
countries already engaged in hostile actions would have violated U.S. neutrality.
United States ships were transferred so they could continue to trade with European
nations without fear of capture. The U.S. government in many cases encouraged these
reflaggings by quickly approving requests for change of registration. In addition, the
U.S. government used the reflagging as a way of providing support to the allies
without becoming politically involved. European ship owners switched flags to avoid
war-time requisitioning of their ships. [Ref. 6: p. 193]
F. POST WORLD WAR II
After WWII the use of flags of convenience rose sharply. There was an
international shipping boom in the 1950s. Shipping firms posted high profits and
governments looked at those high profits as a source of taxation. The higher the
profits rose the higher the taxation became; thus ship owners began the exodus to
other flags with nominal, if not any, taxation. Taxation at this time was the primary
motivation for owners to use a FOC registration. Also under consideration by the ship
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owners was the high cost of labor. The convenience states had less demanding labor-
legislation requirements thus allowing for greater freedom in operations. [Ref. 7: p.
268]
Lack of safety regulations was also cited as a benefit of flags of convenience.
Slack safety regulations permitted owners to save money by cutting corners.
Opponents of FOC were not particularly concerned about safety for safety sake. They
were concerned about the cost savings FOC provided that they could not experience in
their own flag registry. Safety was used as a red herring to get unions and
environmentalests involved in the fight against flags of convenience. The safety records
of FOC have only been shown to be marginally worse than other flag registries.
[Ref. 7: p. 268]
The growth in the popularity of FOC is clearly evident by the rise of the Liberian
flag. Prior to WWII Liberia had no shipping tonnage. By 1958 Liberia was ranked
third in the world with 10,078,778 grt. Panama's fleet increased from 715,525 grt. to
4,357,S00 grt. during the same period [Ref. 7: p. 268]. Table 1 presents the rapid rise of
FOC during this period.
The Honduran flag also grew rapidly during this time as a FOC. Together with
Panama and Liberia these three flags of convenience became known as PANLIBHON.
They were considered the primary flags of convenience and bore the brunt of the
animosity.
During the period from WWII to 1958, resentment grew among owners who had
not changed to flags of convenience. Those who did not change lost some of their
competitive edge. The various seamen's unions saw flags of convenience as lost jobs
for their union members because these ships were now free of labor contracts and
collective agreements.
By 1958 the trend toward reflagging was snowballing. Representatives of the
British shipping industry voiced thier views as follows:
The growth of flag of convenience fleets has reached menacing proportions.
Some means of meeting this tax-free competition must be found. So far, a
resolution has eluded governments, international organizations and the ship
owners whose future depends on one being forthcoming {here the Geneva
Conference on the Law of the Sea is meant}... What must be sought is a solution
which will provide and effective means of adjusting the competitive balance
between Panhonlib operator and those of other countries. The present disparity
is such as to give Panhonlib operator overwhelming advantage over their
competitors. [Ref. 5: pp. 83-84]
14
TABLE 1
NUMBER OF SHIPS REGISTERED TO FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE






1949 462 15 82
1950 495 39 94
1951 545 78 79
1952 545 121 81
1953 540 182 66
1954 519 363 67
1955 513 486 58
1956 535 655 56
1957 560 894 53
1958 548 1,020 39
1959 542 1,015 32
1960 495 875 27
1961 487 836 21
SOURCES: Data collected from Boczek and Gold.
NOTE: * D ata not available.
The international Law Commission (ILC) proposed in 1958 to the United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that there must be a "genuine link"
between the state and the ship. The ILC did not provide a definition of genuine link,
but their intent was to remove flags of convenience from the seas. The legal aspect of
the nationality of ships was the basis for the ILC presentation; the members totally
ignored the economic motivation behind the reflagging.
The United Kingdom and Norway were leaders in the fight against flags of
convenience. These two maritime nations depended heavily on earnings form shipping
for their economic viability. The UK was the second largest shipping state in the world
at this time. Norway was the fourth largest shipping state. British shipping provided
1 1 percent of total earnings. In Norway earnings varied, but on occasion it provided
up to 45 percent. It is easy to understand why flags of convenience were dubbed
15
"Public Enemy No. 1" by Robert Ropner, President of the Chamber of Shipping of the
United Kingdom [Ref. 5: p. 83].
In 1958, the British and Norwegians placed all their hope on UNCLOS
conference. If the flags of convenience could be required by international law to have
a genuine link requirement, the reflagging would slow down if not stop. Article 5 of
the High Seas Convention addressed the situation in this manner: 2
Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the
registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have
the nationality of the State whose flag the are entitled to fly. There must exist a
genuine link between the State and the ship; in particular, the State must
effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and
social matters over ships flying its flag. [Ref. 7: p. 271]
The UNCLOS was unable to solve the problem. The genuined link requirement
was established, but the definition was so vague it proved to be of little help to the
UK, Norway, or any of the other traditional maritime countries. The whole legality of
the issue was a sovereign state's right to grant nationality to ships under rules that it
alone determines. No one was ready or willing to dictate to a sovereign state its right
to determine what ships can fly its flag. One legal historian summed up the traditional
maritime nations push' at UNCLOS as being totally out of place. The traditional
maritime states were attempting to impose a sort of reverse flag discrimination. The
new competitive spirit was what they feared most. [Ref. 7: p. 271] The traditional
maritime nations realized that their problems could not be settled as a legal issue.
They finally faced the real issue, taxation. The PANLIBHON ships were practically
tax-immune and therefore the answer to their problems lay within their own
governments. [Ref. 5: p. 86]
... neither side appears much concerned over what flag flutters from the stern.
But the conflict is being waged with no less vigor because it evolves around
dollars and cents. [Ref. 8: p. 29]
Norway experienced grave problems with its shipping industry in 1958. A large
number of its ships were laid-up. 3 The resentment against flags of convenience grew.
The Norwegians attempted to get an agreement with the British Chamber of Shipping
2The High Seas Convention was the resolution of the UNCLOS.
3 Laid-up ships are in some type of storage whether it be drydocked or just tied to
a pier. Ships are laid-up because there is not enough business or they are
uneconomical to operate.
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to impose prejudiceal harbor fees against PANLIBHON ships.
It seems a bit odd that the L'K would raise such a fuss about flags of
convenience. British ship owners have always been free to register and operate their
vessels from various British Commonwealth countries. Bermuda and the Bahamas
were very attractive flags to fly. Corporations based on these islands, which obtain
their income from operations outside the islands, operate virtually tax free. [Ref. 5: p.
SS]
G. 1960 TO 1980
The UK and Norway were left to their own devices to combat FOC. The
international opposition of FOC still pressed its views by having international
organizations address the situation. Both the United Nations Inter-Governmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) and a sub-group of the IMCO, the
Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), became a forum for presenting cases against FOC.
The use of these organizations, as well as UNCLOS, did very little to discourage the
use of FOC. In fact, the Liberian and Panamanian fleets increased their market share
to almost 20% of the world fleet. [Ref. 7: p. 271] Table 2 presents the changes between
1958 and 1968 in selected fleets.
TABLE 2
GROWTH OF SELECTED FLAG FLEETS
MILLIONS % INCREASE % OF
GRT IN TONNAGE WORLD FLEET
FLAG 1958 1968 1958-1968 1958 1968
UK 19.2 20.6 8 19.2 11.5
LIBERIA 11.1 27.1 144 11.1 15.1
PANAMA 4 5. 4 35 4.4 3.0
NORWAY 9.5 19.1 100 8.5 10.8
SOURCES: Data collected from Gold and MARAD Annual Reports
1958-1968.
The fight against FOC became too much for the traditional maritime nations.
They continued to argue over FOC, trying every way they could to dispose of them. It
was to no avail. The FOC fleets continued to grow. Table 3 presents the changes in
flag registries between 1975 and 1986.
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TABLE 3
GROWTH OF SELECTED FLAG FLEETS 1975-1986
MILLIONS /o INCREASE % OF
GRT IN TONNAGE WORLD FLEET
FLAG 1975 1986 1975-1986 1975 1986
UK 1,592 527 -66 7 2
LIBERIA 2,491 1,783 -28 11 7
PANAMA 1,802 3,611 + 100 8 4
NORWAY 985 387 -61 4 1. 5
SOURCE: Data collected from MARAD Annual Reports 1975-1986.
The extremely large decline of Liberian FOC was due largely to its political
volatility. The coup, led by Samuel Doe, made many owners uneasy and they
reflagged. Panama received many of the new ships. Many British ships were reflagged
to the Bahamas. [Ref. 9: p. 17]
H. SUMMARY
Flags of convenience have been a way of life in the maritime community. They
thrive because ship owners are constantly seeking ways to cut operating costs and
improve profits. When money is a motivater little can be done to hinder their use.
FOC will continue to grow as long as there are no incentives to change. The incentives
may be political or economical. History has provided precedents in every possible
area. Even today the unheard of use of the American flag as a flag of convenience is
taking place because of political reasons. Kuwait tankers are switching so they will be
protected by the U.S. Navy. FOC are used for many reasons and nothing will ever
stop their use or stem the tide. John Whitworth, director of the International Shipping
Federation, summed it up this way. "Attempts to phase out flags of convenience can
only be the ultimate in lost causes" [Ref. 10: p. 13].
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III. PRESENT MARITIME POLICIES
A. INTRODUCTION
Present maritime policies continue to favor the ship owner's quest for the lowest
possible operating cost. Policies in the past which have affected manning have been
more in the social and safety spectrum. The implementation of safety standards in the
work environment was to protect seamen from poorly maintained ships. Safety
standards were the major focus in the past. Improved living facilities, standard hours,
mandatory' crew levels, and better wages have been the primary concern of sailors. The
loss of shipping to flags of convenience has only played a minor role in their concerns
until recent years.
Seafarers are now faced with the long-term effects of flags of convenience. FOC
have reduced the number of positions traditionally held by British and Norwegian
sailors. Every ship owned by a British or Norwegian which is registered to a FOC
represents a loss of the billets on board to foreign labor.
Who can blame the ship owner for wanting to operate his ship in the most
economically efficient way possible? To a certain extent the seafarers have no one to
blame but themselves. In almost every article examined by this writer, the high cost of
union labor was the reason most often given for present day use of FOC. The
Norwegian seafarers in 1985 were among the highest paid in Europe [Ref. 11: p. 7], and
any change in registration would benefit Norwegian owners and rid them of the most
costly operating expense on their ships.
Britain's and Norway's fleets have continued to dwindle. Economic advantages
have continued to be the main reason. Drastic cuts in operating expenses can still be
achieved by reducing crew costs. Crew costs are generally considered to account for
approximately 60 percent of the overall operating costs of a merchant ship [Ref. 11: p.
9]. Figure 3.1 shows the difference in costs savings between UK registries and FOC.
B. FIGHTING BACK
UK and Norway began to fight back. They developed their own registries which
are very similar to FOC. These "captive" registries are designed to offer cost savings
similar to FOC while the ships still maintain the advantages of operating under a
traditional flag. [Ref. 13: p. 10]
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UK FLAG/UK SEAFARERS: $908,000*
LIBERIAN FLAG/KOREAN SEAFARERS: $490,000
HONG KONG FLAG/HONG KONG SEAFARERS: $396,000
SOURCE: Data from "U.K. Owners Still Fleeing Flag."
NOTE: * U.S. dollars.
Figure 3.1 Annual Manning Costs Per Ship.
The new "captive" registries resulted from the United Nations Conference on
Conditions for Registration of Ships. The conference was held under the patronage of
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The
plenipotentiaries of the participating countries adopted the UN Convention on
Conditions for Registration of Ships on 7 February 1986. The most important of the
22 articles in the agreement are articles 8, 9 and 10 which for the first time define the
term "genuine link" [Ref. 14: p. 10]:
• Ship owning company must be based in flag state or have an agent there legally
responsible for the company's business.
• Ship's crew must be nationals or residents of the flag state. 4
• State's laws must be sufficient to exert its jurisdiction and control over ships
flying its flag. 5
• States have the option to either satisfy manning or ownership requirements.
[Ref. 15: pp. 70-71]
The UN convention did very little to curtail the use of FOC which is what it set
out to do. Nothing was accomplished except to open up the way for new flags of
convenience. States can now operate a flag which can attract ship owners by offering
them the choice between manning and management cost savings.
4Only part of the crew must be nationals or residents.
Jurisdiction and control mean the state has sufficient laws and regulations
governing the operation of ships. For example the state has safety standards which are
monitored by inspection to ensure ships comply with regulations and the state has
enough control over the ship: ship owner to make sure ships failing the inspection are
brought up to standards.
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C. NEW NORWEGIAN SHIPPING POLICIES
Norway established a captive registry in July of 1987 as a result of the L'NCTAD
convention. The Norwegian International Ship Registry (NTS) attracted a respectable
number of ships in its first three months of operations. Ship registration, as of 15
September 1987, was 48 with 30 more ships expected to change in the near future.
Seven of the newly registered ships where transferred from foreign flags. [Ref. 16: p.
IS]
The NTS registry was not designed to replace the old Norwegian flag. The
traditional flag will continue to operate for those ships desiring to remain and for those
who do not qualify for NTS registration. The NTS is open to all non-Norwegian and
Norwegian companies involved in international trade [Ref. 17: p. 16]. The company
will have to meet the main requirement which is to base either its commercial or
technical management in Norway. The term "management" is left to the interpretation
of the NTS. The NTS will evaluate each transfer on a case-by-case basis to determine if
the company meets the requirements. [Ref. 13: p. 10]
The NTS offers several advantageous regulations which are intended to attract
foreign operators. The regulations became effective 17 March 1987.
• Foreign owners and seafarers are exempt from Norwegian taxation.
• Flexible manning regulations.
• Reduced crew size. [Ref. 17: p. 16]
• Removal of technical standards that exceed international norms [Ref. 13: p. 10].
The purpose of NTS "...is to keep Norway a center of Maritime activity..."
[Ref. 13: p. 10]. Between 1985 and 1986 Norway's ship registration fell by 18 percent
(in numbers of ships) and its international ranking fell from 13th to 17th. Little
wonder the newly elected Labour government stepped in and created the NTS when the
opportunity presented itself. With the possibility of all Norwegian seafaring tradition
dwindling away to FOC something had to be done. [Ref. 18: pp. 66-67]
D. NEW UNITED KINGDOM SHIPPING POLICIES
The UK has experienced a drastic loss in its shipping capability. British ship
owners continue to switch to FOC. Many changes, however, are made to British






These British associated countries collectively were ranked the fourteenth largest
registry in the world. They were ranked ninth in total deadweight tons6 in 1986. The
British associated countries were ranked twenty-fourth in number of ship registrations
and fifteenth in total deadweight tons in 1984. The rise to fourteenth was a substantial
increase from the 1984 figure. [Refs. 19,20: pp. 12,10]
The British established their own sort of "captive" registries in the Isle of Man
and the Channel Islands. These two registries are effectively FOC. The ships are
entitled to fly the red ensign7 and receive any benefits or protection that flag offers
[Ref. 18: p. 66]. The ship, however, receives the benefit of the protection of the British
Navy it would not otherwise receive if it used a typical FOC such as Panama.
Many British owners have transferred their ships registry and continued to
employ UK mariners. But the terms of employment have been arranged by a Hong
Kong manning company and not UK unions [Ref. 12: p. 44]. These Hong Kong
companies are able to negotiate with the unions and achieve cost reductions for the
owner. Many will negotiate with a union for the original crew and the crew will take a
wage cut. The Hong Kong manning companies are not bound by union agreements
made in other countries. The owners can effectively reduce operating expenses without
changing the crew. If the owner, however, wants a greater reduction in crew cost he
can simply contract for a different crew which has lower salary requirements.
British seafarers over the years have been considered outstanding sailors. The
great maritime tradition of the United Kingdom is a testament to their seamanship
abilities. Thus British seafarers unlike other seafarers are in great demand even though
they are so highly paid. "The British officer may be expensive, but there is still a need
for his knowledge and experience. There is sill a great deal of respect for his abilities."
[Ref. 11: p. 9]
The unusual situation with the British associated countries is that they most
often retain British or Commonwealth officers and replace the rest of the crew with
foreign labor. In fact Bermuda requires British or Commonwealth senior officers serve
on their flag ships [Ref. 21: p. 17].
6Total Deadweight Tons is the total lifting capacity of a ship, expressed in tons
of 2,240 lb. It is the difference between the displacement light and the displacement
loaded.
7The red ensign is the British merchant fleet flag.
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E. THE EFFECTS OF THE POLICIES ON NATO
1. Availablity of Ships
These new captive registries have a great impact on the ability of NATO to
provide ships in time of contingency and war. The pool of ships made available to the
Defence Shipping Authority has now dwindled to 456. Much of the decrease is due to
the use of FOC. Prior to the opening of the NIS registry the Norwegians were
supplying 40 of the 600. Now they are only supplying nine ships and the British are
providing 94. [Ref. 4]
The decrease is not only attributable to FOC but to new technology as well.
Many of the new sleek cargo ships do not lend themselves to military cargo. The ships
remaining in the NATO registries may not be suitable military cargo carriers. If the
ships are not suitable they are removed from the pool list.
Self-sustained ships are the best suited for military cargo. The old traditional
freighters 8 with their huge cranes and large operating crews are the ships most suitable
for military cargo. They are self-sustained sustained and do not require specialized
port facilities to load and unload cargo. The old style freighter with its own cranes can
utilize any port and are not dependent upon specialized cargo handling equipment
shore-side as the new modern container ships9 are.
The old cargo ships are less automated and as a result require more crew.
Therefore they are more likely to reap the benefits of a FOC where they can obtain
cheap foreign labor and sail with a smaller minimum crews. These ships are also the
most likely to be reflagged because they have large ship-board crews and operating cost
can be quickly reduced by changing to foreign crews.
The NIS registry has stipulated that all Norwegian owned ships in its registry
will be available to NATO just as if they were still under the regular Norwegian flag
[Ref. 13: p. 10]. PBOS, however, is unwilling to accept that the ships are under the
complete control of the NIS. PBOS has removed all ships from the pool which are
now registered to the NTS. PBOS and DSA want a clear indication that the ships can
be taken up from trade by the Norwegian government and utilized. At this point
PBOS and DSA are unsure of the true control the Norwegian government has over
these ships. [Ref. 4]
8 Freighter is a general cargo ship capable of carrying break bulk and palletized
cargoes. Vessels have tween decks and on deck cargo gear.
9A container ship is equipped with permanent container cells in all holds and
requires shore-side cranes for loading and unloading containers.
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The new British registries have not indicated whether or not ships registered to
the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands will be made available to NATO. It is also
not clear that the United Kingdom would be able to meet a Faulklands type crisis with
the present merchant fleet situation [Ref. 22: p. 44].
2. Availability of Mariners
These new captive registries have created a great dilemma among NATO
planners. As more and more ships are flagged out there are fewer jobs for NATO
merchant mariners. As the jobs decrease so do the number of mariners. Recruiting
into a declining industry becomes difficult. Potential mariners see the maritime
industry as one with little or no job security. The opportunities for employment after
training are dim. As more ships switch to FOC there are more mariners competing for
each job. Appendix A presents an overall view of the decline of the Norwegian and
British mariners.
Recently Ocean Transport and Trading, a Liverpool based shipping firm,
announced plans to switch eleven of its ships from the British to the Isle of Man flag.
The move is being made solely for the purpose of reducing costs. Ocean Transport and
Trading employs 400 seafarers on these vessels and expects a minimum of 50 jobs will
be lost by British merchant marines. [Ref. 23: p. 16]
It is situations like this which make recruiting so difficult for the industry.
Each year men entering officer training programs declines. The number of cadets
entering training for deck officers in 1985 was 85 and only 39 for 1986. The Nautical
Institute reported to a special committee of Parliament that the present fleet of
approximately 500 ships requires an annual imput of 250 cadets for deck officers alone.
[Ref. 24: p.7]
NATO highly desires NATO mariners on their ships during times of
contingency and war. They are desired because of perceived loyalty they might possess
and because of concerns over security:
...the use of non-NATO flag shipping resources would raise questions about the
extent to which crews of other nationalities could be relied upon to continue to
serve on ships employed by Alliance members in a emergency, and their
suitability. 10 [Ref. 25: p. 487]
I0This is a statement made by the Allied Planning Board for Ocean Shipping in a
report made public by Lord Carrington, the NATO Secretary General.
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Naturally PBOS and DSA would want all the mariners on board the ships to
be NATO members. But if that cannot be the case PBOS and DSA have set up a







This hierarchy was established for reasons of security of operations. A NATO
radio officer is an absolute requirement. The radio officer would have access to
classified NATO communications codes in order to receive and send messages. He
would be receiving information on location of convoys and warships in order to have
his ship link up with them. The speed and course of the convoy would be extremely
sensitive information and it could be used to stop or hinder the flow of vital materials
intended for troops on the firing line. The potential for compromise and disaster is so
overwhelming that a NATO radio officer is the top priority.
The master has complete control over the vessel and the crew. His loyalty to
the cause is extremely important. There is no way to gauge his loyalty but it is
generally assumed that a NATO mariner whose country is at war with the communist
eastern block would be better than an East German or Third World master.
Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher's conservative government has realized the
implications flagging out has had on the availablity of merchant mariners in time of
war or emergency. The Merchant Shipping Bill was announced in June of 1987. The
proposed Merchant Shipping Bill has a provision to set up a pool of experienced
mariners in a Merchant Navy Reserve. The National Union of Seamen view the
reserve as a "duplication of effort". One British journalist was very critical of the
conservative shipping policy of Mrs. Thatcher:
There have already existed such a reserve, several thousand unemployed seafarers
thrown on the scrap heap by Mrs. Thatcher's apparent eagerness to allow ship
owners to "flag-out" to Third World countries unable, or unwilling, to enforce
adequate standards of safety or training. [Ref. 26: p. 10]
The General Secretary of the National Union of Seamen, Sam McCloskie,
said, "I envisage this new body becoming little more than "Dad's Navy" of ill-trained
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seafarers." [Ref. 26: p. 10] These statements are indicative of the unions' feeling on
Mrs. Thatcher's free-market policy. The unions have lost many jobs because ships
have been allowed to reflag to FOC without concern for the future needs of maritime
labor. The unions have been highly critical of the government's policies. They see the
policies as catering to the owners. The unions feel the government has left them to the
wolves.
F. SUMMARY
The rise in the use of FOC has rapidly increased in Norway and the United
Kingdom. More ship owners are avoiding the high cost of expensive European labor
by shifting to FOC. The development of "captive" registries did little to discourage the
use of FOC. In fact the new UNCTAD convention may have done more to increase
the use of FOC as traditional maritime nations begin to use them to attract shipping to
their countries.
The UK has only just begun to realize the implications FOC can have on the
availability of merchant mariners in times of war and contingency. The development
of the Merchant Navy Reserve is a step towards treating the symptom, but the true
problem is the ability of ship owners to transfer from one flag to another with such
ease. Flags of convenience will exist until there are no longer any economic or political
reasons to change. FOC will continue to grow and domestic fleets will continue to




In this chapter a trend and regression analyses are presented on the data
contained in Appendix A and B. The regression analysis abbreviations are contained
in Appendix C. The regression data is contained in Appendix D. The analyses are
intended to provide some insight into the effect the number of merchant ships
registered to the United Kingdom and Norway has on the number of merchant marine
officers employed by their respective countries. The trend analysis describes what has
happened to the merchant marine industry. The regression analysis describes the effect
that ship registries has had on the number of merchant mariners.
B. ANALYSIS OF ENGLISH DATA
1 . Trend Analysis
The number of masters, deck, radio officers and cadets declined 59 percent
between 1972 and 1985. English registered ships declined 69 percent during the period
of 1972 and 1986. The decline in the English engine room officers and cadets was very
similar. They dropped by 60 percent. This declining trend and the similarities between
them may be seen in Appendix E. Since all of the graphs are so similar, a regression
analysis on the data was run to determine if the decline of officers was a result of the
decline in number of ships. Because it is reasonable to assume that there is a
relationship between them, a regression analysis is considered appropriate.
2. Regression Analysis
It is the large and similar changes in both sets of data which prompted the use
of a regression analysis. Because both percentage changes are large there is a
possibility of their being related. The regression is used to determine if the number of
British registered ships may any have influence over the number of mariners employed
by the United Kingdom. The results of the regressions are contained in Appendices F,
G, H and I.
The results of the regression are reasonable because of the original assumption
that the two sets of data are related is true. The regression analysis provided linear
equations for each data set. The slope of the equations are both very steep. This
makes the equations much more accurate because the further the slope is away from
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zero the better it is at predicting the independent variable, in this, case Ecrew and
Emen.
The plot of the standard residuals in both cases suggests a curvilinear
relationship between the independent variable and the predicted dependent variables.
In fact the two plots are very similar in shape. The plot of Emen versus Eship
contained in Appendix I has a much smaller deviation from zero than the plot of
Ecrew versus Eship contained in Appendix G. The curvilinear relationships could be
explained by new advances in technology. The use of technology has reduced the crew
size over the years and as ship are removed the relative loss in crew has been less than
in the past. The cyclic nature of the shipping industry could also be an explanation of
the curvilinear shape.
The similarity in the two regressions on the English data continues with the R-
squared figures. The R-squared for the Ecrew regression is 86% and for the Emen
regression is 86.7%. These numbers indicated that the independent variable Eship
explains 86% and 86.7% of the variation in the dependent variables.
C. ANALYSIS OF NORWEGIAN DATA
1. Trend Analysis
The number of masters, deck, radio officers and cadets has declined 20%
between 1972 and 1985. The number of engine room officers and cadets declined 24%
during the same period. Norwegian ships however declined 60%. There is definitely a
declining trend in all categories but the percentages are very different between officer
data and ship data. The relationships between the data may be seen in Appendix J.
A large decrease in ships occurred between 1977 and 1980. There are several
reasons for this decrease. The first is the world-wide recession which occurred at the
end of 1977. The decline in ships was even more dramatic because the shipping
industry had reached and all-time record peak in supply and demand for ocean
transportation in 1977. Also during this time the North Seas oil fields were begining to
come on line. These oil fields, located in Norwegian waters, eliminated the need for
many of the Norwegian oil tankers and there respective crews.
The data could have even shown a steeper drop but the data collected
included mariners on ships 100 grt. and over for 1980 and 1981. Like the UK data the
Norwegian data tended to decline at the same rate between Nmen and Ncrew. The
data for Nships did not decline at the same rate. A regression was run to see how
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strong the relationship is between the independent variable Nship and the dependent
variables Ncrew and Nmen.
2. Regression Analysis
The use of Nship as the independent variable in both regressions was
considered a reasonable choice because the number of Nships should be an indicator of
the number of merchant marine officers. The regressions run on the Norwegian data
did not show as strong as a relationship between officers and ships as there was in the
English data. Appendices K, L. M and N are the results of the two regressions.
The slope of the two regression equations are 1.72 and 1.57. These slopes are
much closer to zero than the slopes generated for the English data. This indicates that
the regression equation is not as accurate a predictor of Pncrew and Pnmen as the
British data.
The R-squared figure is lower for the Norwegian data. The relationship
between the data is not as strong. Only 81% and 84% of the variation in the
dependent variables may be explained by the independent variable Nship. However,
this is still a very large percentage and proves that there is a strong relationship
between Nship and merchant officers in Norway.
D. SUMMARY
The data for Eship and Nship was used as the independent variables in four
regressions. The purpose was to determine how much of an effect the number ships
has on the number of merchant marine officers in the United Kingdom and Norway.
The regressions explained a large portion of the variance in the number of mariners in
all four cases. Therefore the decline in the number of ships explains a very large





The continued use of flags of convenience is not expected to go away. The
UNCTAD decision has in fact made a new type of FOC, the captive' registry. FOC
have always been apart of the world's ocean shipping heritage and it is unlikely that
they will ever go away. As long as there are economic and political advantages, FOC
will be a practical alternative for ship owners.
There has been a decline in the number of ships registered to Norway and the
United Kingdom. FOC is just one of many reasons for the decline. The relationship
between the decline in ships and the decline in mariners has been established by the
regression analysis. The change in number of ships has an impact on the number of
mariners. The R-squared figures point out that the change in ships can account for
81%-86.7% of the change in the number of mariners.
The ability of NATO to crew its ships with the required officers will become
more difficult if the trend toward reflagging continues. There is doubt that reflagging
will stop. The ability to crew the pool of ships with officers is not in jeopardy at this
time. The number of ships required for a NATO country to supply to the pool is
automatically adjusted to the number and type of ships registered to the country.
Ships flying the Norwegian and UK flags are crewed with officers from their respective
countries. Major crewing problems will arise when the pool of ships shrinks to such a
small size that NATO is not capable of handling the military cargo required for the
immediate reinforcement of Europe. When the pool is determined to be too small
additional ships will be required to be taken up from trade. 11 The ability of NATO
countries to crew these ships with NATO officers will be extremely difficult because
their present complement of officers may be from many different non-NATO nations.
The British government has realized that the ability to crew the ships taken up
from trade will be difficult and has established the Merchant Navy Reserve. If this
11 Taking up ships from trade occurs when merchant ships owned by citizens or
companies based in a country but are registered to another are confiscated by the
country where the owners or companies are based for military purposes.
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action proves to be helpful to them, other NATO countries should follow Britains lead.
If not, the NATO reinforcement of Europe may not be as successful as NATO
planners may hope for.
31
APPENDIX A
MARINERS EMPLOYED IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND NORWAY
MASTERS & DECK OFFICERS** ENGINE ROOM OFFICER
YEAR UK NORWAY UK NORWAY
1985 7,005 6,501 7,785 4,667
1984 7,956 6,748 8,916 4,903
1983 10,182 6,809 11,424 4,925
1982 12,577 7,107 13,846 5,025
1981 15,266 7,384+ 17,065 5,064+
1980 16,553 7,165+ 18,825 4,9111
1979 17,476 6,935 20,358 4,849
1978 * * * *
1977 19,002 7,624 23,683 5,444
1976 19,540 7,565 24,343 5,423
1975 20,250 7,609 26,287 5,481
1974 18,926 7,716 25,713 5,646
1973 * 7,947 * 5,873
1972 17,000 8,148 19,500 6,142
SOURCE: Data collected from Maritime Transportation 1973-1985 editions, ships
over 100 git.
NOTES: * Data not published. ** Including radio officers, apprentices and
cadets. *** Including apprentices and cadets, + Including ships under 100 grt.
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APPENDIX B
MERCHANT FLEETS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND NORWAY










1977 1,526 1 ,003
1976 1,552 999
1975 1,592 985
1974 1,609 1 ,028
1973 1,627 1 ,118
1972 1,713 1 ,199
SOURCES: Data collected from MARAD Annual Reports 1972-1986.
NOTE: Data based on ships 1,000 grt. and over.
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APPENDIX C
ABBREVIATIONS USED IN DATA ANALYSIS
Ecrew: English Masters, Deck Officers, Radio Officers and Cadets.
Emen: Engine Room Officers and Cadets.
Eship: English registered ships.
Ncrew: Norwegian Masters, Deck Officers, Radio Officers and Cadets.
Nmen: Norwegian Engine Room Officers and Cadets.
Nship: Norwegian registered ships.
Pecrew: Predicted value of Ecrew for the regression.
Pemen: Predicted value of Emen from the regression.
Pncrew: Predicted value of Ncrew for the regression.
Pnmen: Predicted value of Nmen for the regression.
Secrew: Standard residuals of Ecrew vs. Eship.
Semen: Standard residuals of Emen vs. Eship.
Sncrew: Standard residuals of Ncrew vs. Nship.
Snmen: Standard residuals of Nmen vs. Nship.
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APPENDIX D
REGRESSION ANALYSIS GENERATED DATA
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0. 35011 18957. 0. 37676 23488.
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0. 52331 19388. 0. 97782 24092.
0. 39422 19571. 0. 61065 24349.





Sncrew Pncrew Snmen Pnmen
* 6575. 46 * 4573. 31
1. 14101 6727. 07 -0. 26277 4711. 32
0. 35416 6820. 10 0. 61744 4796. 00
0. 45189 6902. 80 0. 30404 4871. 28
0. 78670 6942. 42 0. 66067 4907. 35
1. 96925 6969. 99 0. 73515 4932. 44
0. 79287 6997. 55 -0. 25886 4957. 54
2. 22554 7416. 20 -2. 66040 5338. 63
* 7593. 64 * 5500. 16
0. 06001 7636. 71 -0. , 52883 5539. 37
•0.
, 30567 7629. 82 -0. , 60988 5533. 09
0. , 01549 7605. 70 -0, , 16640 5511. 14
0, , 17210 7679. 79 0, . 37643 5578. 57
•0,
, 04296 7955. 43 0, . 26034 5829. 50
0, . 89030 7974. 39 1 , 77873 5846. 75
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APPENDIX F
REGRESSION OF ECREW VERSES ESHIP AND PLOT OF ECREW AND
ESHIP
The regression equation is
Eraen = 63 + 15. 1 Eship
12 cases used 3 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio
Constant 63 2352 0.03
Eship 15.094 1.871 8.07
s = 2467 R-sq = 86.7% R-sq( adj ) = 85.4%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS
Regression 1 396292608 396292608
Error 10 60878272 6087827
Total 11 457170688
Unusual Observations
Obs. Eship Emen Fit Stdev. Fit Residual St. Resid
15 1713 19500 25919 1198 -6419 -2. 98R
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APPENDIX H
REGRESSION OF EMEN BY ESHIP
The regression equation is
Emen = 63 + 15. 1 Eship
12 cases used 3 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio
Constant 63 2352 0. 03
Eship 15.094 1.871 8.07
s = 2467 R-sq = 86.7% R-sq(adj) = 85.4%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS
Regression 1 396292608 396292608
Error 10 60878272 6087827
Total 11 457170688
Unusual Observations
Obs. Eship Emen Fit Stdev. Fit Residual St. Resid
15 1713 19500 25919 1198 -6419 -2.98R
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APPENDIX I
PLOT OF STANDARD RESIDUALS AND PREDICTED EMEN
1. 5 +
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APPENDIX J
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APPENDIX K ..-_..
REGRESSION OF NCREW AND NSHIP
The regression equation is
Ncrew = 5909 + 1. 72 Nship
13 cases used 2 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio
Constant 5908.7 216.0 27.35
Nship 1.7228 0.2511 6.86
s = 225.4 R-sq = 81.1% R-sq(adj) = 79.3%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS
Regression 1 2392449 2392449
Error 11 559084 50826
Total 12 2951533
Unusual Observations
Obs. Nship Ncrew Fit Stdev. Fit Residual St. Resid
8 875 6935.0 7416.2 63.8 -481.2 -2.23R
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APPENDIX M
REGRESSION NMEN VERSUS NSHIP AND PLOT OF NMEN VERSUS
NSIIIP
The regression equation is
Nmen = 3966 + 1. 57 Nship
13 cases used 2 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio
Constant 3966.4 183.9 21.57
Nship 1.5683 0.2137 7.34
s = 191.9 R-sq = 83.0% R-sq(adj) = 81.5%,
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS
Regression 1 1982502 1982502
Error 11 405082 36826
Total 12 2387584
Unusual Observations
Obs. Nship Nmen Fit Stdev. Fit Residual St. Resid
8 875 4849.0 5338.6 54.3 -489.6 -2. 66R
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